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A Legislative Framework to Avoid a Vulgar
Trademark System
JORDAN J. KILIJANSKI†
INTRODUCTION
There has been a recent run on the United States Patent and
Trademark Office to register the most vulgar and obscene trademarks
possible.1 After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Matal v. Tam and Iancu v.
Brunetti an individual is now able to register a trademark, to be used on
their products and services, no matter how immoral, scandalous, or
disparaging the trademark may be.2 This result has left observers to view
the new trademark registration system as FUCT®.3
A trademark is a device—such as words, names, or symbols—used
by a merchant to identify its goods or services and to distinguish them
from those of others.4 Any person who uses a trademark belonging to
† J.D. Candidate, 2021, University at Buffalo School of Law; B.S. Biology, 2013, D’Youville
College; Executive Publications Editor, Buffalo Law Review. I am grateful to my Buffalo Law
Review colleagues for their diligence and dedication to producing exceptional publications. I
would like to thank Professor Mark Bartholomew for teaching an inspiring course and for his
insightful review of an earlier draft of this Comment. Finally, I would be remiss if I failed to
thank my wife, family, and friends for the support and encouragement that made this
publication possible.
1. See, e.g., FUCK YOU PAY ME, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88/358,352
(filed Mar. 27, 2019); PUSSY MONEY WEED, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
88/486,356 (filed June 24, 2019).
2. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017); Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299
(2019).
3. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751; Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2299; FUCT, Registration No.
5,934,763.
4. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW
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another in a way that is likely to confuse the consuming public about the
source or sponsorship of the goods or services will be liable to the
trademark holder. 5 Congress established a system that grants nationwide
protection for federally registered trademarks, and incentivizes the
promotion of trademarks in conjunction with high quality, or at least
consistent quality, good and services.6
By allowing the registration of patently vulgar and obscene
trademarks, these trademarks will soon become commonplace in the
market, and consumers will be forced to wade through waters muddied
with vulgarity to find the product they desire. While the majority of
people may not want their sensibilities attacked while shopping, these
vulgar trademarks will seep into commerce and on to the shelves of the
local store because some people are attracted to these products. In a free
market when the shop owner finds the point where appealing to the
minority to sell a few items with vulgar trademarks will offset the profits
lost by customers refusal to shop at that store, these vulgar marks will be
displayed. The vast majority of people should not have to sacrifice their
morality when shopping for groceries.
When Congress passed the Lanham Act of 1946, they codified the
first set of extensive and cohesive federal trademark laws.7 Prior to this
codification there was basic federal and state level protection for
trademarks, but the implementation of a federal registration system
greatly expanded upon these protections.8 The first subchapter of the
Lanham Act, named the Principal Register, provides the basic
requirements for eligibility for federal trademark registration, and a
description of the application and registration process.9 A trademark that
meets the requirements of the Principal Register is afforded remedies for
infringement under federal statute.10
In 2017, the Supreme Court held that a portion of the Principle
Register of the Lanham Act was unconstitutional.11 In Matal v. Tam, the
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 539 (2003).
5. Id. at 541.
6. See id. at 546.
7. A Guide to the Lanham Act of 1946, LAWS (Dec. 23,
https://trademark.laws.com/lanham-act-of-1946/lanham-act-of-1946-background.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
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Supreme Court decided whether the federal law prohibiting registration
of trademarks that may “disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or
disrepute” any “persons, living or dead” was constitutionally valid.12 The
Court weighed this federal law against the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment and held that the provision was facially invalid under the
Free Speech Clause.13 The Court concluded that the provision of 15
U.S.C. § 1052(a) was contradictory to the bedrock First Amendment
principle that “speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses
ideas that offend.”14 Thus, the ruling in Tam invalidated a portion of the
statute that determined whether trademarks were registrable on the
Principal Register.15 The statute no longer stated that trademark
registration will be refused if the trademark were to consist of “matter
which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living
or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into
contempt, or disrepute.”16 This ruling then left the door open to challenge
the other portion of § 1052(a) that states that a trademark will be refused
registration if it “consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or
scandalous matter.”17
The Supreme Court soon took on this provision of § 1052(a) by
granting certiorari in the case of Erik Brunetti’s attempted registration of
the mark “FUCT.”18 Here, the Court determined whether the prohibition
on immoral or scandalous marks was constitutional in the light of the Free
Speech Clause.19 The Court held that the immoral or scandalous bar
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint; thus, this bar violates First
Amendment doctrine.20 In doing so, the Court held that the “immoral or
scandalous” bar in § 1052(a) is unconstitutional.21
During the Brunetti ruling, four Justices recognized the reaching
impact of the ruling and offered various ways to save § 1052(a) so that it

12. Id. at 1751; 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
13. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751, 1755.
14. Id. at 1751.
15. Id. at 1765; 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2298 (2019).
19. Id. at 2297.
20. Id. at 2299.
21. Id. at 2302; In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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would bar vulgar or obscene terms.22 The proposed means consisted of
narrowly keeping part of the statute23 or allowing Congress to create a
new statute.24 Since, the majority quashed the idea of statutory surgery to
keep a narrower statute, Congress must now be tasked with a rewrite of
§ 1052(a).25
Before a statutory rewrite of § 1052(a) can be undertaken, it must
first be understood how the Supreme Court found that the majority of
section 1052(a) was unconstitutional. Part I discusses the history of how
and why 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) was invalidated. Part II works to highlight
the outer limits to the arguments of the judicial opinions and analyze the
reasoning in view of the totality of the case lineage of Matal v. Tam and
Iancu v. Brunetti. After a comprehensive understanding of the judicial
barriers that have been erected, Part III discusses how new legislation can
be written to provide some protection from registration of obscene and
vulgar trademarks.
I.

HISTORY OF THE STATUTE AT ISSUE AND HOW IT WAS INVALIDATED

A. History of 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)
Historically, the first section of the Lanham Act of 1946, codified as
15 U.S.C. § 1051, established that the owner of a trademark used in
commerce may apply for federal registration and be afforded additional
benefits conferred from the registration.26 The second section of the
Lanham Act of 1946 set a limit on those rights.27 The very first limit that
Congress placed on federally registered trademarks was that the mark
cannot consist of “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter.”28 The next
limit imposed by Congress was that the matter must not “disparage or
falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions,
beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”29
Between these two limitations, it has been established that prohibition

22. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302–04, 2308.
23. Id. at 2308.
24. Id. at 2303.
25. Id. at 2302.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1051.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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against marks which contain immoral or scandalous matter constitutes a
distinct legal claim, as opposed to prohibition against marks which
disparage or bring into contempt or disrepute persons, institutions or
beliefs, or those which falsely suggest connection.30
The outdated analysis performed by the Patent and Trademark
Office (“PTO”) in determining whether a trademark is immoral or
scandalous is different than the test to determine whether a trademark is
disparaging. While the test for an immoral or scandalous mark must be
viewed in the context of the general population, the test for a disparaging
mark is only viewed in the context of the referenced group.31
An immoral or scandalous trademark must be a mark that is viewed
by the general public as giving offense to the conscious or moral feelings
or shocking the sense of decency or propriety.32 The legal analysis used
to determine whether a mark will be immoral or scandalous is first that
the PTO must consider the trademark in the context of the marketplace
as applied to the goods described in the application for registration.33
Next, the PTO considered whether the mark consists of or comprises
scandalous matter determined from the standpoint of a substantial
composite of the general public (not necessarily a majority), and in the
context of contemporary attitudes, keeping in mind changes in social
mores and sensitivities.34 Additionally, a showing that a mark is vulgar is
sufficient to establish that it consists of or comprises immoral or
scandalous matter.35
Examples of trademarks held to be immoral or scandalous include
“JACK-OFF” for adult oriented phone conversations36 and “BULLSHIT”
to appear on the outside of apparel accessories.37 Trademarks that have
been allowed that may seem immoral or scandalous are “WEEK-END

30. McDermott v. S.F. Women’s Motorcycle Contingent, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1212,
2006 TTAB LEXIS 390 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
31. See In re Boulevard Ent., Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Geller,
751 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
32. In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863, 865, 1981 TTAB LEXIS 106, at *7
(T.T.A.B. 1981).
33. In re Boulevard Ent., 334 F.3d at 1340.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1339.
37. In re Tinseltown, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 863, 1981 TTAB LEXIS 106 at *1.
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SEX” for a magazine38 and “BADASS” for bridges for stringed musical
instruments.39 In light of these determinations by the PTO, the appeals
board, and the Circuit Court, immoral or scandalous marks must truly
shock the conscious of the general public to be denied registration.
A disparaging mark is one which dishonors in comparison with what
is inferior, slights, deprecates, degrades, or affects or injures by unjust
comparison.40 The legal analysis that the PTO would use to determine if
a trademark was disparaging was a two part test.41 First, the examining
attorney would determine what is the likely meaning of the matter in
question.42 To do this the examining attorney would take into account not
only dictionary definitions, but also the relationship of the matter to the
other elements in the mark, the nature of the goods or services, and the
manner in which the mark is used in the marketplace in connection with
the goods or services.43 Second, if that meaning is found to refer to
identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, the
examiner would then determine whether that meaning may be
disparaging to a substantial composite of the referenced group.44
For context, some of the marks that have been denied for being
disparaging are “STOP ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA” for services to
understand and prevent terrorism45 and “SQUAW” for clothing
accessories.46 Some of the trademarks held to not be disparaging have
been “DYKES ON BIKES” for education and entertainment services47

38. In re Madsen, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334, 335, 1973 TTAB LEXIS 212, at *3
(T.T.A.B. 1973).
39. In re Leo Quan Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 370, 370, 1978 TTAB LEXIS 102, at *1
(T.T.A.B. 1978).
40. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 124 (D.D.C. 2003).
41. See In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 1361–62.
46. In re Squaw Valley Dev. Co., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1264, 1266, 2006 TTAB LEXIS
189, at *3 (T.T.A.B. 2006). According to Native American tribal leaders, “squaw” is currently
a derogatory and offensive name for Native women. See Harold McNeil, Farewell, Squaw
Island. Hello, Unity Island, BUFFALO NEWS (June 24, 2015), https://buffalonews.com/
news/local/farewell-squaw-island-hello-unity-island/article_64469c1b-5d89-5683-abe7924d953e38fe.html.
47. McDermott v. S.F. Women’s Motorcycle Contingent, 240 F. App’x 865, 868 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
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and “JAP” for clothing.48 This two part test provided some guidance to
the PTO examiners to make a reasonable decision about whether a
trademark is prone to disparaging a substantial amount of the referenced
group, but as seen with the examples above, this test only precluded
trademarks that were considerably disparaging.
In the seventy years from the inception of the Lanham Act until the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Tam, the trademark system had some
gatekeeping function that kept trademarks that were truly offensive from
bombarding the public with offensive terms in commerce. Although, as
shown with the examples above, this protection was inconsistent and not
absolute. Despite the imperfect nature of precluding offensive terms, the
protection that § 1052(a) did provide was a safety net to truly keep the
worst subject matter away from the general public or specific referenced
groups.
B. Matal v. Tam
The Supreme Court’s eventual ruling in Matal v. Tam was the first
ruling to invalidate a provision of § 1052(a).49 This case arises out of
Simon Tam’s application to register the trademark “THE SLANTS” for
a musical band.50 It is well established that “slants” is a derogatory term
for persons of Asian descent and Simon Tam even admits as such.51 The
band members are all Asian, and they believe that, by taking the slur as a
band name, they will help to reclaim the term and remove the belittling
connotations associated with the term.52
Simon Tam sought to register THE SLANTS for a musical band on
March 5, 2010, after using the name in commerce since November 15,
2006.53 Tam eventually abandoned this application after the examining
attorney refused to register the application for being disparaging to people

48. In re Condas S.A., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 544, 544, 1975 TTAB LEXIS 133, at *1
(T.T.A.B. 1975).
49. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
50. THE SLANTS, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85/472,044 (filed Nov. 14,
2011).
51. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751.
52. Id.
53. THE SLANTS, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77/952,263 (filed Mar. 5,
2010).
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of Asian descent.54 Tam again applied for registration of THE SLANTS
mark on November 14, 2011.55 Registration of the mark was refused by
the examining attorney on the ground that applicant’s mark consisted of
or included matter that may disparage or bring into contempt or disrepute
persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols under § 1052(a).56 After
Tam’s request for reconsideration was denied, he appealed the decision
to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”).57
1. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
On appeal, the submitted evidence focused on multiple points, the
first of which was the dictionary definition of the term “slant” and how
the Asian community as a whole perceived the term.58 By using various
dictionaries ranging from published works to community sourced
websites, the Board found that a definition for the term “slant” in the
proposed context was “offensive slang used as a disparaging term for a
person of East Asian birth or ancestry.”59 The Board additionally found
specific examples of Asian groups that found the term “slant”
disparaging.60 First, the Oregon Commission on Asian Affairs pulled
support for “The Slants” band specifically, and cited the reason as their
offensive name.61 Additionally, a band member was set to give a keynote
address at an Asian American Youth Leadership Conference, but
conference supporters and attendees felt the name of the band was
offensive and racist so the organizers chose to have someone less
controversial speak.62
In review of the facts, the Board applied the two part test and first
found that the likely meaning was a derogatory reference to people of
Asian descent based on the dictionary definitions and the response by the
Asian community to the name.63 Next, in analyzing the second part of the
54. In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 568 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
55. THE SLANTS, Registration No. 5,332,283.
56. In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1305, 1306, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 485, at *2 (T.T.A.B.
2013).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1306–07, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 485, at *3–4.
59. Id. at 1308, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 485, at *7.
60. Id. at 1307–08, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 485, at *5–7.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1309, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 485, at *10–11.
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test, the Board took into account all members of the Asian American
public as they may encounter the mark THE SLANTS in advertising in
newspapers, billboards, or on a website.64 When taking this view, the
Board found that THE SLANTS was disparaging to a substantial
composite of the referenced group—noting that even the applicant did
not dispute that the band’s name was derived from an ethnic slur.65
Therefore, the Board found sufficient legal standing to affirm the
examining attorney’s refusal of registering THE SLANTS under §
1052(a).66
2. Federal Circuit
After Simon Tam lost the appeal with the Board, he appealed this
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.67
On this appeal, Tam reasserted his claim that the mark THE SLANTS
was not disparaging under § 1052(a) and was first able to challenge the
constitutionality of § 1052(a).68
The Federal Circuit began by affirming the Board’s finding that the
mark was disparaging under § 1052(a) by again going through the two
part test to determine if a mark is disparaging.69 The Federal Circuit’s
application of the two part test used many of the same findings of the
Board’s two part test.70 First, the court found that the mark THE SLANTS
likely refers to people of Asian descent by examining the record.71 The
record reflected that the dictionary terms explain “slants” as referring to
people of Asian descent, Tam himself admits in an interview that Asians
are associated with slant eyes, the band’s Wikipedia page states that the
name is derived from an ethnic slur for Asians, the band uses a depiction
of an Asian woman in front of the rising sun imagery, and individuals and
groups have perceived the term as referring to people of Asian descent.72
With the likely meaning of the mark established, the court turned to

64. Id. at 1312, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 485, at *22.
65. Id. at 1312, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 485, at *22–24.
66. Id. at 1313, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 485, at *24–25.
67. In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 568 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
68. Id. at 569.
69. Id. at 569–71.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 570.
72. Id. at 570–71.
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whether the meaning may disparage a substantial composite of the
referenced group.73 Under this analysis, the court found that definitions
universally say that “slants” is disparaging; a brochure by the Japanese
American Citizens League describes the term “slant” as a derogatory term
when used to reference people of Asian descent. Furthermore, news
articles and blog posts discussed the offensive nature of the band’s
name.74 Thus, the Federal Circuit court found that THE SLANTS was a
disparaging mark by showing the likely meaning of the term and that it
may be disparaging to a substantial composite of the referenced group.75
At the challenge of Mr. Tam, the Federal Circuit then assessed the
constitutionality of § 1052(a).76 The court proceeded with a four-step
inquiry. This included assessing whether the statute violated the First
Amendment, whether the statute was void for vagueness, whether
requisite due process was afforded, and whether the rejection violated the
Equal Protection Clause.
First, when assessing whether the statute violated the First
Amendment grant of Freedom of Speech, the court answered two of
Tam’s contentions: that the statute was facially unconstitutional and that
the benefit of registration was conditioned on the relinquishment of
speech.77 To resolve this dispute, the court cited precedent that states: “the
PTO’s refusal to register appellant’s mark does not affect his right to use
it. No conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is
suppressed. Consequently, appellant’s First Amendment rights would not
be abridged by the refusal to register his mark.”78 The court then
determined that § 1052(a) is not unconstitutional for violating the First
Amendment because refusal to register doesn’t foreclose use of the
mark.79
The second constitutional challenge was that § 1052(a)’s use of the
terms “scandalous” and “disparage” were unconstitutionally vague.80 The
court found that it was inherently difficult to create an objective measure

73. Id. at 571.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 572 (citing In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981)).
79. See id.
80. Id.
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of the general public’s various viewpoints.81 Additionally, the court stated
that the current standard gave sufficiently precise methods for the PTO
and courts to apply the law and give notice to a would be registrant of
what will not be granted a federal registration.82 Although the court only
assessed the “scandalous” term in the statute, it declared that the same
rationale applies to “disparaging” marks and held that the standard is not
unconstitutionally vague.83
Tam also argued that the PTO violated due process by applying the
disparagement provisions arbitrarily and without clear guidelines.84 Tam
argued that by refusing to register his mark but granting similar marks,
like “DYKES ON BIKES,” the PTO violated the Due Process Clause.85
Regarding this point, the court found that during registration there was
no due process violation because the applicant was provided a full
opportunity to prosecute his applications and to appeal the examining
attorney’s final rejections to the Board.86 The court rejected the due
process argument by reasoning that each application is considered on its
own merits and third party applications do not bind the PTO to
improperly register marks.87
The final constitutional argument that Tam raised was “that because
the examining attorney’s disparagement analysis hinged on his and his
bandmates’ ethnic identities, the rejection of the mark violated” the Equal
Protection Clause.88 The court reasoned that the denial was not on account
of Mr. Tam’s race.89 This was because the Board reasoned that “[a]n
application by a band comprised of non-Asian-Americans called THE
SLANTS that displayed the mark next to the imagery used by applicant
. . . would also be subject to a refusal under [§ 1052(a)].”90 The court
stated that they have held that a trademark refusal does not violate equal
protection so long as there are nondiscriminatory reasons for denying

81. Id.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
86. In re Tam, 785 F.3d at 572.
87. Id. at 572–73.
88. Id. at 573.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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registration.91
In publishing the opinion, Circuit Judge Moore offered additional
views to the argument for the constitutionality of § 1052(a). Within Judge
Moore’s additional views, she analyzed three topics. First, she looked at
whether trade names are protected speech.92 Second, she analyzed
whether § 1052(a) is an abridgment of speech.93 Third, her analysis
concluded with whether § 1052(a) was unconstitutional.94 By looking at
these three topics Judge Moore is explaining how an argument can be
made for § 1052(a) to be unconstitutional if she was not bound by
precedent.
When discussing whether trade names were protected speech, Judge
Moore looked to recent Supreme Court decisions to determine that
trademarks are protected speech under Supreme Court commercial
speech doctrine.95 Although commercial speech is a form of protected
communication under the First Amendment, it does not receive as much
free speech protection as noncommercial speech, such as political
speech.96 Judge Moore concluded that trade names were protected speech
by finding that commercial speech is a protected form of speech and, in
the case of THE SLANTS, the mark raised political discussion such that
it is granted a higher level of First Amendment protection.97
Next, Judge Moore addresses whether § 1052(a) is an abridgment of
speech.98 Judge Moore undercuts the holding in McGinley which states
that the refusal to register a mark under § 1052(a) does not bar the
applicant from using the mark, and therefore does not implicate the First
Amendment by showing the loss of protection from not having a
registerable mark.99 This holding stems from the fact that a mark-holder
can obtain state common law trademark protection in lieu of federal
91. Id.; see also In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 1174–75 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
92. In re Tam, 785 F.3d at 574 (Moore, J., providing additional views on In re McGinley,
660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981)).
93. Id. at 575.
94. Id. at 581.
95. Id. at 575.
96. David Schultz, Commercial Speech, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/900/commercial-speech (last visited Apr. 8,
2021).
97. See In re Tam, 785 F.3d at 575.
98. See id.
99. Id.; see also In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981).

2021]

AVOIDING A VULGAR TRADEMARK SYSTEM

921

protection. Judge Moore pointed out the numerous rights that a markholder loses with only common law protection. These rights include a
presumption of validity after five years of registration, prevention of
cybersquatters misappropriating a domain name, and access to federal
remedies for trademark infringement under § 1125(a).100 She also pointed
to the loss of common law protection since most states have adopted the
Model State Trademark Bill, which mirrors the Lanham Act, and makes
it likely that an unregistrable trademark will have no state protection.101
In furthering the analysis as to whether § 1052(a) is an abridgment
of speech, Judge Moore states that the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine must be implicated in the denial of trademark protection.102 The
unconstitutional conditions doctrine states that “the government may not
deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected . . . freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that
benefit.”103 This argument balances the government’s ability to define the
limits of a program that uses government funds and the government’s
inability to infringe on constitutional protections through a regulatory
regime.104 In 1991, PTO operations changed from being underwritten by
public funds to being substantially funded by registration fees.105 With
this change in funding, Judge Moore notes that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine applies and the Supreme Court’s precedential
analysis of the constitutionality of § 1052(a) in McGinley no longer
suffices.106
Finally, the third topic Judge Moore addressed was whether §
1052(a) is unconstitutional.107 Here, she analyzed the statute under the
Central Hudson test, which determines the constitutionality of
restrictions on commercial speech.108 Judge Moore found that THE

100. See In re Tam, 785 F.3d at 576; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
101. See In re Tam, 785 F.3d at 577.
102. See id.
103. Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006) (alteration
in original) (citation omitted).
104. See In re Tam, 785 F.3d at 578–80.
105. See id. at 580.
106. Id. at 581.
107. See id.
108. Id. The Central Hudson test states: “commercial speech . . . must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation
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SLANTS mark was not illegal or misleading and the Government failed
to put forth a substantial interest.109 Judge Moore found that without any
substantial government interest, § 1052(a) cannot satisfy the Central
Hudson test.110
3. Federal Circuit En Banc Review
After Judge Moore set out the argument for invalidating § 1052(a)’s
disparagement clause as unconstitutional, an en banc hearing in the
Federal Circuit was ordered sua sponte.111 The hearing was set to address
the sole issue of “[d]oes the bar on registration of disparaging marks in
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) violate the First Amendment?”112
In the en banc decision of the Federal Circuit, Judge Moore wrote
for the majority of the court, and first held that the disparagement
provision of § 1052(a) is subject to strict scrutiny because it burdens
private speech based on disapproval of the message conveyed.113 The
court then concluded that the provision could not survive strict
scrutiny.114 The court concluded that invalidating a trademark for
disparaging a certain group discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.115
Section 1052(a) is viewpoint discriminatory on its face because the PTO
will not register a mark that refers to a group in a negative way, but it
permits the registration of marks that refer to a group in a positive, nondisparaging manner.116 Thus, § 1052(a) is perceived as a viewpointdiscriminatory regulation of speech, created and applied in order to stifle
the use of certain disfavored messages.117
Next, the court held that prohibition on the registration of
disparaging trademarks was not a regulation of commercial speech.118
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.” See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
109. See In re Tam, 785 F.3d at 582.
110. See id. at 585.
111. In re Tam, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
112. Id.
113. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1336.
117. Id. at 1337.
118. Id.
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Although the speech is ultimately commercial, as it will be used with a
product or service, the court here states that it is critical to note that the
mark’s expressive character, not its ability to serve as a source identifier,
is the basis for the exclusion from registration for being disparaging.119
When the commercial speech is “inextricably intertwined” with
expressive speech, it is treated as expressive speech under the First
Amendment when the expressive aspect is being regulated.120 Because
the speech being regulated by the disparagement provision is considered
expressive speech, it is afforded special protection under the First
Amendment.121 Since § 1052(a) discriminates on the basis of the content
of the message conveyed by the speech, it is presumptively invalid, and
must satisfy strict scrutiny to be found constitutional.122
Although § 1052(a) does not ban speech, the court finds that the
prohibition on the registration of disparaging trademarks significantly
chills private speech on discriminatory grounds.123 The court starts with
the general premise that “if the government could deny a benefit to a
person because of his constitutionally protected speech . . . , his exercise
of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would
allow the government to produce a result which it could not command
directly.”124 This means that if the government can obtain the same effect
as banning speech by denying benefits associated with the speech, the
government act is in violation of the First Amendment. Here, the court
cites to three government actions that effectively chill someone from
registering a disparaging trademark. These are threatened denial of
registration and litigation costs associated with challenging this denial,
the uncertainty of the validity of a disparaging mark, and the lack of state
law protection after most states adopted a form of the Lanham Act called
the Model State Trademark Act.125 All of these actions contribute to
effectively chilling the speech of a potentially disparaging trademark.
The court also denies the Government’s contention that trademark
registration is government speech as “[t]he Free Speech Clause restricts

119. Id. at 1338.
120. Id. at 1339 (citing Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1340 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
125. Id. at 1341–44.
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government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government
speech.”126 Here the court claims that use of a mark by its owner is clearly
private speech and strengthens this argument by analogizing trademarks
with copyrights that are considered not to be public speech.127 The court
denies that the right to put the ® symbol on a registered mark, the
issuance of a certificate of registration, and being listed on a government
database are all accoutrements of copyright registration and thus cannot
be government speech.128
Next, the court holds that the message based discrimination is not
merely the government’s shaping of a subsidiary program.129 Here the
court cites to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine that states that “the
government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech even if he has no
entitlement to that benefit.”130 Here the court finds that trademark
registration is a regulatory regime and not a government subsidiary
program.131 If trademark registration were a government subsidiary
program, it would include the authority to impose limits on the use of
such funds to ensure they are used in the manner Congress intends, even
when these limits exclude protected speech or other constitutionally
protected conduct.132 The court concludes that because the benefits
bestowed on mark-holders are valuable not monetary; funded by
registration fees and not the taxpayer; and the Lanham Act is derived
from the Commerce Clause, not the Spending Clause, trademark
registration is a regulatory regime and not granted the breadth of a
subsidiary program.133
Finally, the court finds that even though § 1052(a) regulates
expressive speech, it will fail to meet a lower standard of intermediate
scrutiny if it were classified as commercial speech.134 The Central

126. Id. at 1345 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009)).
127. Id. at 1345–48.
128. Id. at 1345–47.
129. Id. at 1348.
130. Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006) (quoting
Board of Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cnty. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996)).
131. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1353.
132. Id. at 1349.
133. Id. at 1352–54.
134. Id. at 1355.
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Hudson test is applied to determine if commercial speech is consistent
with the First Amendment.135 The court finds that there is nothing illegal
or misleading about disparaging marks in general, and the government
cannot assert a substantial government interest in preventing disparaging
marks.136 Although the argument is that the goal in not registering
disparaging marks is to “declin[e] to expend its resources to facilitate the
use of racial slurs as source identifiers in interstate commerce,” the court
rejects this as permitting the government to burden speech it finds
offensive.137 The court finds that there is no legitimate government
interest and finds that the disparagement provision fails the Central
Hudson test.
The Federal Circuit’s en banc hearing found the disparagement
provision of § 1052(a) unconstitutional and held that the First
Amendment protected Mr. Tam’s speech, and the speech of other
trademark applicants.138
4. Supreme Court
After the Federal Circuit found the disparagement clause facially
unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the lower
court, with Justice Alito delivering the majority opinion.139
In the majority opinion the Court rules that the disparagement clause
facially discriminated on the basis of viewpoint and “the First
Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor
some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.”140 The majority
opinion denies the argument that trademarks are government, not private
speech with a prudential and doctrinal argument.
In the prudential argument the Court argues that the federal
government does not dream up the marks, and it does not edit marks
submitted for registration and if private speech could be passed off as

135. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
136. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1355.
137. Id. at 1356–57.
138. Id. at 1357.
139. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
140. Id. at 1757 (citing Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 394 (1993)).
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government speech by simply affixing a government seal of approval,
government could silence or muffle the expression of disfavored
viewpoints.141
The doctrinal argument is that, in Walker, the Court found the outer
bounds of the government speech doctrine when it held that the messages
on Texas specialty license plates are government speech.142 The license
plates were government speech because license plates have long been
used by the states to convey state messages, the public associates license
plates with the state, and Texas maintained direct control over the
messages conveyed on its specialty plates.143 Since trademarks don’t
align with any of these rationales, the Court held that trademark
registration was vastly different than the license plates in Walker.144 Thus,
the majority holds that trademarks are private, not government speech
and are not afforded extra protection for viewpoint discrimination.145
The majority of the court is unable to agree that the Government’s
argument that trademarks are a form of government subsidy, and that the
constitutionality of the disparagement clause should be tested under a
new “government program” doctrine should be denied.146 Although four
Justices split the Court’s decision on these two topics (Justice Gorsuch
took no part in the opinion), the four Justices concurred with the
holding.147 Justice Kennedy authored the opinion for the concurrence and
found that “[§] 1052(a) constitutes viewpoint discrimination—a form of
speech suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous
constitutional scrutiny. The Government’s action and the statute on which
it is based cannot survive this scrutiny.”148 The concurrence finds that
there are few categories of speech that the government can regulate or
punish including fraud, defamation, and incitement and that the
disparagement clause was not one of the exceptions.149

141. Id. at 1758.
142. Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 204 (2015).
143. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1760 (citing Walker, 576 U.S. at 206–14).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1751.
147. Id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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C. Iancu v. Brunetti
After the ruling in Matal v. Tam held that the disparagement
provision of § 1052(a) was unconstitutional, it was only a matter of time
until someone challenged the constitutionality of the rest of the statute.
What was left in the statute was that a trademark could not consist of
“immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter.”150 The deceptive portion of
this statute is not addressed because two tenets of trademark law are to
make the customer experience more efficient and protect a mark-holder’s
investment. A deceptive mark would directly undermine these goals.
What is addressed is whether a mark can be immoral or scandalous and
this was challenged by Erik Brunetti.
On May 3, 2011, Erik Brunetti filed for registration of the word mark
FUCT, to be used on athletic apparel and children and infant’s apparel.151
The registration was denied by the examining attorney at the PTO as the
examining attorney found the mark vulgar and as such containing
immoral or scandalous matter.152 The legal determination that was used
to deny registration was to consider the term in the context of the
marketplace as applied to applicant’s identified goods.153 Furthermore,
the analysis must be made from the standpoint of a substantial composite
of the general public, and in terms of contemporary attitudes.154 The
Board heard the appeal of this decision and affirmed the refusal to
register.155
1. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
The Board’s findings provide a factual setting for the case. The
examining attorney found that “fuct” is the phonetic equivalent of the
word “fucked” and the past tense of the word “fuck.”156 In light of these
findings, Mr. Brunetti contended that the term “fuct” is not so scandalous
as to justify the refusal to register, that the mark FUCT is a coined word

150. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
151. TEAS Plus Application for “FUCT” mark, USPTO TSDR CASE VIEWER (May 3,
2011), https://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn85310960&docId=FTK201105060
74222#docIndex=30&page=1.
152. In re Brunetti, No. 85310960, 2014 WL 3976439, at *1 (T.T.A.B. 2014).
153. Id. at *2.
154. Id.
155. Id. at *1.
156. Id.
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that has no meaning other than his brand name and the statutory bar of
scandalous and immoral is too broad in light of evolving First
Amendment jurisprudence, i.e., Matal v. Tam.157 Mr. Brunetti also later
contended that FUCT is an acronym for “Friends U Can’t Trust.”158 The
Board answers these contentions in turn, but explicitly denies to answer
whether § 1052(a) is constitutional as an agency cannot make a decision
on constitutionality.159
First, the Board shows that dictionary evidence concludes that the
term “fuck” is vulgar. The Board references many dictionaries that
characterize the word “fuck” as offensive, extremely offensive, and
highly offensive.160 Additionally, the term “fuct” has been defined
through Urban Dictionary, a community-edited dictionary, as “the past
tense of the verb fuck.”161 This was found to be enough evidence to prove
that the term “fuct” is sufficiently vulgar to be “immoral or scandalous
matter.”
Second, the Board links Mr. Brunetti’s clothing line to the two
definitions of “fucked.” In terms of the definition that has sexual
connotations, the Board found that images on Mr. Brunetti’s website
contained explicit sexual imagery that objectified women.162 This was
enough to link the meaning of the mark to a substantial definition of the
term “fucked” and not just an arbitrary set of letters. Regarding the other
definition of “fucked” that refers to “having no chance of success,” the
Board found an overarching theme of Mr. Brunetti’s clothing and website
to be a rejection of moral principles and embodying anti-social imagery
of despair.163 By linking these definitions to the mark FUCT, it shows that
FUCT was chosen precisely to be offensive, yet ambiguous enough to
provide plausible deniability.164
The Board affirmed the denial of registration of the mark FUCT.
They found that, in 2014, a substantial composite of the general public

157. Id.
158. Id. at *3.
159. Id. at *5.
160. Id. at *3.
161. Id.
162. Id. at *4.
163. See id.
164. See id.
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would find the mark vulgar.165 Thus, the mark was properly refused under
§ 1052(a)’s “scandalous or immoral matter” standard.
2. Federal Circuit Court
Mr. Brunetti appealed the Board’s decision to United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and Judge Moore authored the opinion,
as she did in Matal v. Tam. The Federal Circuit found that the mark at
issue did comprise of immoral or scandalous matter, but the court found
that § 1052(a)’s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is
unconstitutional.166
First, the court determines that the mark FUCT is vulgar and
therefore scandalous.167 The court stated that “the PTO may prove
scandalousness by establishing that a mark is ‘vulgar.’”168 The court here
relies on the same evidence as the Board did to come to this conclusion.
The court finds that the mark is vulgar and that there is a clear link
between the mark FUCT and the word “fucked.”169 Mr. Brunetti’s
arguments that Urban Dictionary is an unreliable dictionary, that the
examining attorney used random images from outdated products to show
a link between the mark and a definition, and the fact that he only received
a single complaint in over twenty years of operation are all struck down
by the court.170 The court here found that the vulgarity of the mark is
overwhelming to defeat any contention and it is thus scandalous matter.171
Next, the court turned to whether § 1052(a) was constitutional and
found that the bar on immoral or scandalous marks infringed the First
Amendment.172 The court found that neither the majority or concurring
opinions of Tam reached an answer to the question of whether the
immoral or scandalous provisions of § 1052(a) were constitutional.173 On
this appeal, the Government conceded that the bar on registering immoral

165. Id. at *5.
166. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
167. Id. at 1337.
168. Id. at 1336 (quoting In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633, 635 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
169. Id. at 1338.
170. See id. at 1338–39.
171. See id. at 1339–40.
172. Id. at 1340.
173. Id. at 1341.
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or scandalous marks is a content-based restriction on speech.174 The
Government did assert that § 1052(a)’s content-based bar on registering
immoral or scandalous marks does not implicate the First Amendment
because trademark registration is either a government subsidy program
or limited public forum, the two specific arguments that the Supreme
Court failed to reach a majority decision on in Tam.175
The court here again denies that trademark registration is a
subsidiary program.176 Once again, the court reiterates their main
reasoning to conclude that the trademark registration system is a
registration program rather than a subsidiary program. First, federal
trademark law does not derive from the Spending Clause and directly
implicate Congress’ power to spend and control government property.177
Next, trademark registration is mostly paid for by applicants, not
taxpayers.178 Finally, the benefits that trademark registration bestows on
the applicant are valuable and not analogous to a grant of federal funds.179
By this rationale the court denies that trademark registration is a
subsidiary program with censorship authority.180
Next, the court determined that trademark registration is not a
limited public forum where the government may place limitations on
speech.181 This argument stems from the principle that “the government
need not permit all forms of speech on property that it owns and
controls.”182 There are three types of forums that the trademark speech
may fall into. The first two do not permit restrictions based on viewpoint
and those are traditional public forums such as streets and parks and
designated public forums where government property that has not
traditionally been regarded as a public forum is intentionally opened up
for that purpose.183 The last type of public forum is a limited public forum

174. Id. at 1342.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1344.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1345.
181. Id.
182. Id. (citing Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992)).
183. Id. at 1346.
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where the government can reasonably restrict speech, such as a city bus
or a military cemetery.184 The court found that because trademarks are
used in commerce, the trademark registration program bears no
resemblance to these limited public forums and rejected this argument.185
Finally, the court found that there was no reasonable definition of
the statutory terms scandalous and immoral which would preserve their
constitutionality.186 The court attempted to constrain scandalous or
immoral to mean either obscene material or terms with sexual
connotations, but could not do so.187 The court reasoned that “there is no
dispute that an obscene mark would be scandalous or immoral; however,
not all scandalous or immoral marks are obscene.”188 Thus, the court
refused to doctor the statute to make the terms work with the intent of
forbidding obscene or lewd matter.
The Federal Circuit concluded by holding that the bar in § 1052(a)
against immoral or scandalous marks was unconstitutional because it
violated the First Amendment.
3. Supreme Court of the United States
This case eventually made its way up to the Supreme Court to
determine the validity of the immoral or scandalous provision of §
1052(a). In this decision the Court holds that the bar on the registration
of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks discriminates on the basis of
viewpoint and, thus, violates the First Amendment.189
Justice Kagan writes for the Court and relies on the proposition
established in Tam that if a trademark registration bar is viewpoint-based,
it is unconstitutional.190 Here, all the Court had to find was that the
immoral or scandalous bar discriminated on the basis of viewpoint to find
it unconstitutional.191 Since the Government did not argue that the
immoral or scandalous bar did not discriminate based on viewpoint, the
Court holds that the immoral or scandalous bar was unconstitutional in

184. Id.
185. Id. at 1347.
186. Id. at 1355.
187. Id. at 1355–56.
188. Id. at 1355.
189. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
190. Id. at 2299.
191. Id.

932

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

light of the First Amendment.192
The Court in turn affirms the judgement of the Federal Circuit and
held that the bar on the registration of “immoral” or “scandalous”
trademarks discriminates on the basis of viewpoint and, thereby violating
the First Amendment.193
II.

GUIDEPOSTS ESTABLISHED FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RESURRECTION OF § 1052

As the judicial barriers were being constructed around § 1052, one
major theme was lurking in the background of the decisions and at the
forefront of the multiple dissents in part. This theme was an effort to save
the statute in some form as the Justices knew the treacherous impact of
invalidating § 1052(a). This theme is self-evident because a tension can
be felt in the Justices’ writing as many were uncomfortable with the result
of declaring § 1052 unconstitutional.
It is important to note that this uneasy feeling did not come solely
from dissenting Justices. This was first evidenced in the Federal Circuit’s
en banc opinion, written by Judge Moore, regarding THE SLANTS
trademark. The Federal Circuit’s en banc hearing found the
disparagement provision of § 1052(a) unconstitutional, but immediately
distanced themselves from THE SLANTS trademark by saying that
“nothing we say should be viewed as an endorsement of the mark at
issue.”194 It is clear that the court understands that there is an offensive
nature to the trademark at issue so much so that they are willing to clarify
their condemnation of it, an opportunity not afforded to the PTO.
This trend continues in the Federal Circuit In re Brunetti decision.
The court prefaced its holding by admitting that “the use of such marks
in commerce [will be] discomforting, and [the court is] not eager to see a
proliferation of such marks in the marketplace.”195 The court then makes
the association of trademarks to copyrights, both operating under a
federal system, and the existence of vulgar copyrights.196 This is a way to
justify that the public is already inundated with vulgar material so the
addition of more vulgarity to the public realm is of no consequence.
192. See id. at 2302.
193. See id.
194. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
195. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
196. See id.
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This tension was also felt in Brunetti, after the Government
contended that the Court should narrow the statute to bar “marks that are
offensive [or] shocking to a substantial segment of the public because of
their mode of expression, independent of any views that they may
express.”197 The goal of this interpretation would be to exclude only
marks that are vulgar, sexually explicit, or profane.198 The Court refuses
to limit the statute as the statute is not ambiguous enough to allow this
type of interpretation and the Court cannot effectively rewrite a statute as
it sees fit.199 After hearing this argument and potentially sparked by the
ramifications of the eventual decision, one concurring and three
concurring in part and dissenting in part opinions are offered to lay the
foundation for a new statutory provision.
This concurrence was from Justice Alito, the author of the Tam
decision. In his concurrence, he notes that although the Court cannot alter
the statute in effect, the decision did not prevent Congress from adopting
a more carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks
containing vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of ideas.200
He views the mark FUCT, and others like it, as not needed to express an
idea since the marks contain nothing more than emotion and a severely
limited vocabulary.201
Although the majority in Brunetti interprets the immoral bar and the
scandalous bar to have the overlapping meaning of ideas that are hostile
to moral standards, the three Justices who dissented in part viewed the
scandalous bar as different than the immoral bar.202 The first of these was
Chief Justice Roberts who offers an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, to argue that although the immoral bar cannot be saved,
the scandalous bar certainly can be.203 He agrees with Justice Sotomayor
that scandalous can be narrowly viewed to only include marks that are
obscene, vulgar, or profane and that the government has an interest in not
associating itself with such trademark.204
197. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2301.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 2301–02.
200. Id. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring).
201. Id.
202. See Ned Snow, Immoral Trademarks After Brunetti, 58 HOUS. L. REV. 401, 436–37
(2020).
203. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2303 (Roberts, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. Id.
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The next concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion is authored
by Justice Breyer who also joins Justice Sotomayor in her opinion. In this
opinion he agrees that the immoral bar cannot be saved and the
scandalous bar can by allowing it to refer only to highly vulgar or obscene
modes of expression.205 Justice Breyer does not approve of the stringent
denial of any “viewpoint discriminatory” matter as he believes there
should be a sort balancing test to see if the regulation poses a danger to
the speech the First Amendment is trying to protect.206 He would “ask
whether the regulation at issue ‘works speech-related harm that is out of
proportion to its justifications.’”207 Justice Breyer goes on to provide
compelling rationale for the “highly vulgar or obscene” bar and states that
“[t]he Government has at least a reasonable interest in ensuring that it is
not involved in promoting highly vulgar or obscene speech, and that it
will not be associated with such speech.”208
Finally, Justice Sotomayor offers the most persuasive opinion in an
attempt to save the scandalous bar. She begins her opinion bleakly by
stating that “[t]he Court’s decision today will beget unfortunate
results.”209 She argues that the scandalous term should be preserved only
to bar obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity.210 She provides convincing
statutory interpretation, that shows that although the courts has seen the
statute as containing an immoral and scandalous bar, “immoral” and
“scandalous” are actually separated by an unrelated word—deceptive—
and should be viewed separately.211 She then goes on to provide examples
of words that are not protected by the First Amendment, such as fighting
words or defamatory words, and concludes that the reinterpreted
scandalous bar should be viewed the same.212 She also concludes that the
“Government has a reasonable interest in refraining from lending its
ancillary support to marks that are obscene, vulgar, or profane.”213

205. Id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2305 (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012)).
208. See id. at 2306–07 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209. Id. at 2308.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 2310–11.
212. See id. at 2313–14.
213. Id. at 2317.
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III. HOW TO WRITE NEW LEGISLATION
The multiple opinions published throughout Tam and Brunetti prove
that there must be some protection against registering certain types of
trademarks. Justice Sotomayor warned of a “coming rush to register such
trademarks—and the Government’s immediate powerlessness to say
no—is eminently avoidable.”214 This rush has already begun by
applicants attempting to register what can only be seen as the most
“vulgar, profane, or obscene” trademark that an applicant can possibly
register.215 So long as these trademarks are used in commerce and are not
misleading or run afoul with some other provision of the Lanham Act,
they will end up being registered.
The overall policy rationale to avoid publishing these types of marks
is evident, but may be lost on some. Justice Breyer articulates the most
persuasive rationale for stopping the dissemination of these mark in that
“the Government may have an interest in protecting the sensibilities of
children.”216 Protecting the sensibilities of children is paramount in our
country and has been done for decades through the Federal
Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) obscene, indecent, or profane
material on television and radio.217 Even as society is introduced to
advances in technology, the concept of protecting children from certain
content is relied upon by parents everywhere. To this effect, parental
controls have been implemented into digital video services, video games,
mobile devices, and many other forms of software.218 Without the PTO’s
ability to deny “vulgar, profane, or obscene” trademarks there is no
agency, government or otherwise, protecting our children from this

214. Id. at 2308.
215. See, e.g., FUCK YOU PAY ME, supra note 1; PUSSY MONEY WEED, supra note
1.
216. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Denver Area Ed. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 743 (1996)).
217. See Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov
/consumers/guides/obscene-indecent-and-profane-broadcasts (Jan. 13, 2021).
218. See Use Parental Controls on Your Child’s iPhone, iPad, and iPod Touch, APPLE
(Sept. 22, 2020), https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201304; YouTube Kids Parental Guide,
GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/youtubekids/answer/6172308?hl=en (last visited Mar.
20, 2020); Family & Online Safety, MICROSOFT XBOX, https://beta.support.xbox.com/help/
family-online-safety/browse (last visited Mar. 20, 2020); Dalvin Brown, Spotify Upgrades
Family Plan Subscription, Rolls Out Parental Controls for Music Service, USA TODAY (Aug.
20, 2019, 11:36 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkingtech/2019/08/19/spotifyadds-long-requested-parental-control-feature-family-plan/2049557001.
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content as there are no parental controls for life.
Justice Moore would have us believe that children are already
exposed to odious content. She ends her opinion in Brunetti by explaining
that “there are . . . a cadre of similarly offensive images and words that
have secured copyright registration by the government. There are
countless songs with vulgar lyrics, blasphemous images, scandalous
books and paintings, all of which are protected under federal law.”219 She
may be right, but as a general public we are not inundated with odious
content unless we choose to be. These vulgar lyrics that she speaks of are
censored on the radio through the FCC or through the streaming service.
The blasphemous images are not posted on the street corner, they are in
a gallery where the copyright owner can charge admission. The
scandalous books can be vetted by book reviewers before a reader picks
it up. This is not the same for trademarks. Trademarks are posted in such
a manner as to draw attention to itself and products. Without protections
in place a child can view the vulgar trademarked name in their corner
store with a parent powerless to intervene.
While as a society we initially think of functions like parental
controls to protect children, these systems, and others, are used to protect
the sensibilities of adults as well. An adult may not want to listen to
profane music, and they can easily achieve this goal by listening to the
radio and filtering out explicit songs on the streaming services.220
Additionally, the Motion Picture Association’s film ratings system may
be intended to help parents determine if a film is appropriate for their
children, but it is also appropriate for adults to use to protect their own
sensibilities.221 Among other factors, the film ratings system has a direct
correlation between how many “expletives” are used and how suitable
the film is for children.222 One can easily understand the likelihood of
vulgar or obscene content by the rating of a film and, as such, may choose
to forgo watching a restrictively rated movie in favor of one less
restrictively rated and very likely more wholesome. This ability of
avoidance of vulgar or obscene should not limited to entertainment and

219. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
220. See How to Filter Out Explicit Songs on Spotify in a Few Quick Steps, SPOTIFY (Oct.
4, 2019), https://newsroom.spotify.com/2019-10-04/how-to-filter-out-explicit-songs-onspotify-in-a-few-quick-steps/.
221. See Classifications and Rating Rules, MOTION PICTURE ASS’N 1 (July 24, 2020),
https://www.filmratings.com/Content/Downloads/rating_rules.pdf.
222. See id. at 7.
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should be present for adults who go about their everyday tasks in the
marketplace.
It is undeniable that there must be some protection from the
dissemination of “vulgar, profane, or obscene” trademarks. Although the
straightforward argument to make is the protection of the “sensibilities of
children,” the sensibilities of adults that do not wish to partake in certain
content is also relevant. With a hallmark of trademark law being to make
the consumer experience more efficient, adults may not wish to wade
through the trash of obscene or vulgar trademarks in hopes of purchasing
the product they desire. It is clear that some protection must be provided
and the Legislature must be the one to do so.223
A. Can the Disparagement Provision Be Implemented in a Different
Form?
The Supreme Court has made it clear that “if a trademark registration
bar is viewpoint-based, it is unconstitutional.”224 The PTO’s two-part test
consists of determining the likely meaning of a term, and then finding if
it is disparaging to the group referenced. This test looks only to if one
group disapproves of the term while presumably the group offering the
term approves of it. This two-part test is inherently viewpoint-based and
the effects of the test stemming from the disparagement provision are
inherently viewpoint-based as well. As such, the provision is unlikely to
be saved as it lived. This is not to say that disparagement should be
entirely conceded through trademark law as the final proposed legislation
can include a ban on contentless race-based epithets.225
B. Can the Immoral Standard Be Implemented in a Different Form?
Through the way that the dissenters who defended the scandalous
standard intentionally differentiated the scandalous bar from the immoral
bar, the likely answer is no.226 The Supreme Court in Brunetti found that
immoral means “inconsistent with rectitude, purity, or good morals” and
determined it to be viewpoint-based.227 Justice Sotomayor didn’t attempt

223. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2308 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
224. Id. at 2299 (majority opinion).
225. See discussion infra Section III.D.
226. See Snow, supra note 202.
227. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2299.

938

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

to defend this finding and even took steps to perform statutory surgery to
carve the immoral standard away from the scandalous standard, as they
were traditionally read together.228 Through the opinion in Brunetti and
the dissents, it is clear that no attempt should be made to save a form of
the immoral standard, partly because it is inherently viewpoint-based and
partly because it was used only as a redundant way to say scandalous, in
§ 1052(a).
C. Can the Scandalous Standard Be Implemented in a Different Form?
The answer is yes, and it is what should eventually be done. In
Brunetti, the Supreme Court did not rule this out; rather, the Court only
decided not to narrow the statutory language of the scandalous
provision.229 The Court writes that “[t]he statute as written does not draw
the line at lewd, sexually explicit, or profane marks.”230 The issue in
Brunetti was not whether the basis for the scandalous provision was
unconstitutional, but whether the court could interpret the statute to read
as constitutional. The subsequent answer was no.
The general theme of the concurrences and dissents to Brunetti is
that the scandalous term must be narrowed in any successive legislation.
Chief Justice Roberts writes that “‘scandalous’ need not be understood to
reach marks that offend because of the ideas they convey; it can be read
more narrowly to bar only marks that offend because of their mode of
expression—marks that are obscene, vulgar, or profane.”231 He is
advocating for a focus on the mode of expression, which was argued by
the Government to defeat the viewpoint bar. Justice Breyer offers that
“we should interpret the word ‘scandalous’ in the present statute to refer
only to certain highly ‘vulgar’ or ‘obscene’ modes of expression.232
Finally, Justice Sotomayor argues that “[p]rohibiting the registration of
obscene, profane, or vulgar marks qualifies as reasonable, viewpointneutral, content-based regulation.”233 By taking the majority opinion into
account as well as the dissenting opinions, it is likely that the Court would
allow a statutory bar on obscene, vulgar, and profane marks which stems

228. Id. at 2309 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
229. Id. at 2301 (majority opinion).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 2303 (Roberts, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
232. Id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
233. Id. at 2317 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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from a narrowing construction of scandalous marks.
D. Proposed Legislation
Although the Supreme Court intentionally left the door open for a
statutory rewrite of the scandalous provision of § 1052(a), a statutory
rewrite should not be taken lightly with the ever evolving First
Amendment jurisprudence. Just forty years ago in McGinley, the Federal
Circuit ruled that refusal to register a trademark under the immoral or
scandalous bar did not affect applicant’s right to use it and thus did not
abridge his First Amendment rights.234 With the First Amendment being
afforded wider protection, any statutory rewrite should be able to
withstand a foreseeable First Amendment expansion.
The proposed legislation must be two-fold. First, a tangible
government interest must be implicated in trademark law. Second, there
must be a concrete way to ensure that viewpoint is not implicated.
The first portion of a statutory rewrite must be to give the
government a tangible interest in ensuring that it does not promote
obscene, vulgar, or profane speech. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Breyer and Sotomayor agree that “[t]he Government has at least a
reasonable interest in ensuring that it is not involved in promoting vulgar
or obscene speech, and that it will not be associated with such speech.”235
This may be so, but Judge Moore of the Federal Circuit was not persuaded
that there was a government interest in trademark registration. This stems
from the fact that, in 1991, the PTO’s operations went from being
underwritten by public funds to being substantially funded by registration
fees.236 This change made the trademark system wholly a statutory regime
and not at all a subsidiary.
In response to this hurdle and to allow the government to express a
tangible government interest, the PTO funding must change back to being
underwritten by public funds, at least in part. By underwriting the
trademark system with public funds, it exemplifies that the trademark
system is not just in place to effectuate business needs but also to
minimally regulate communication. In turn, any judge who wishes to

234. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981), abrogated by In re Tam, 808
F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
235. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2306–07 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
236. See In re Tam, 785 F.3d at 580.
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ensure the survival of a new trademark provision against obscene, vulgar,
or profane marks can latch on to this new fee implementation as the funds
will truly be used for public benefit.
This change back to being underwritten by public funds will be the
first step in ensuring that a new statute barring obscene, vulgar, or profane
speech will be able to survive the scrutiny of the courts. This new
implementation of funding the PTO through public funds must be
implemented as a tax, routed through the Treasury. As part of the
trademark system includes a benefit granted to every citizen, the tax
dollars must come from the people, but only in part. Similar to how
regulatory fees are distinct from application fees in the FCC, so too can
these public funds be in addition to the current application fee.237 By
implementing this system, the trademark registration process will be
structured more as a subsidiary system with the authority to impose limits
on the use of such funds to ensure they are used in the manner Congress
intends.
The second statutory make up, is that Congress must state the intent
to bar obscene, vulgar, or profane marks explicitly through a statute. One
way to implement this statute would be to simply rephrase § 1052(a) to
include a bar on obscene, vulgar, or profane marks. This would state: “No
trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from
the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register
on account of its nature unless it—(a) Consists of or comprises . . .
deceptive, [obscene, vulgar, or profane matter] . . . .”238
There are two main problems with this approach. The first, is that
the new statute may survive under the Roberts Court, but may eventually
be held unconstitutional with changes in First Amendment jurisprudence.
Secondly, this rewrite would preserve the inconsistencies that were
present when the PTO attempted to classify immoral or scandalous or
disparaging marks.239 Specifically, the PTO struggled with the
disparagement provision as it became “impossible to fully enforce
[because] its application became ‘highly subjective.’”240 Although the

237. See Regulatory Fees, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/licensing-databases/fees/regulatoryfees (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
238. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (where proposed revisions are shown by alteration to the existing
language).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 36–39, 45–48 (providing examples of trademarks
that were granted or denied protection seemingly inconsistently).
240. Snow, supra note 202, at 434.
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disparagement provision always had a degree of individuality to the
analysis, this subjectivity could infect a minimal statutory rewrite when
rational people disagree over what constitutes an obscene, vulgar, or
profane mark.
The better way to grant the statutory authority to bar obscene, vulgar,
or profane marks would be to explicitly grant the Department of
Commerce the authority to hold words out as unregistrable after notice
and comment rulemaking. This would be a grant of statutory authority to
allow the Department of Commerce and subsequently the PTO to put a
trademark applicant on notice of a running list of words that cannot
appear in any trademark.
A word barred cannot be seen as a viewpoint barred. Statutory
interpretation has taught the legal profession that “[w]ords are not pebbles
in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only
does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their
aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they are used.”241
A singular word cannot express a viewpoint unless used in conjunction
with another word. For example, simply stating the word “cancer” creates
no viewpoint, but adding a word to create the phrase “eradicate cancer”
expresses a definitive viewpoint. Also, words, especially profane words,
can have almost an immeasurable amount of meanings. A word like
“fuck” has been likened to silly putty, where one can stretch it to just
about any meaning that you need to.242 When words are written, as is
usually done with a trademark, and appear in a vacuum, there is no
viewpoint conveyed because of the lack of context and potential
ambiguity of the definition.
This “running list” of barred words (and types of images) would
allow obscene, vulgar, and profane marks to be barred, as well as the
worst race-based epithets.243 In addition to that list, the phonetic
equivalent and derivatives of the words on the list would also be barred.
A list can easily be generated by using the tactics that the Board uses to
evaluate a trademark application.244 The difference is that this list would
then need to go through notice and comment rule making so that the

241. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
242. History of Swear Words: F**k (Netflix Jan. 5, 2021).
243. See Sonia K. Katyal, Brands Behaving Badly, 109 TRADEMARK REP. 819, 824–27
(2019) (discussing the run on registering the worst race-based epithets and the intentions of
some applicants).
244. See supra Sections I.B.1, I.C.1.
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public can weigh in on what words may meet the obscene, vulgar, and
profane threshold. The notice and comment rulemaking process and
subsequent publication in the Federal Register also has the effect of
putting potential applicants on notice of the barred words. This solves the
problem of allowing viewpoints to be expressed through trademarks in
two ways. First, a viewpoint is unlikely to be expressed through a singular
word. Second, even if so, a person can still express their viewpoint, they
just may not do so by utilizing a limited number of barred words.
This also solves the problem of the public being inundated with
abysmal language during their shopping experience. The counterpoint
may be that people will be inundated by new and similar meaning words,
but that is what is meant to be preserved. The “list” leaves the door open
for businesses to conjure up creative ways to express a previously
vulgarly expressed viewpoint and allows for the freedom of speech. This
protects the sensibilities of children and the average consumer because
even if there was a clever way to express a vulgar concept, that actual
word would not be present.
Finally, the list may and should be updated on a yearly or multiyearly basis by the Department of Commerce to include newly obscene,
vulgar, or profane words and potentially purge words that may no longer
meet the obscene, vulgar, or profane threshold. The courts have stated
that obscene, vulgar, and profane words have evolved over time as these
types of words arose from religious phrases and have evolved into words
based on sexual or excretory functions. While the evolution of unique
obscene, vulgar, and profane words may have slowed in the past century
or more, the emergence of more acronyms used in the English language
should prompt the Department of Commerce to be on guard for new
words to bar. By the Department of Commerce being able to update the
list, it allows for an evolution of the bar on certain obscene, vulgar, and
profane words.
CONCLUSION
The proposed legislation for filling the major hole left by § 1052(a)
must be two-fold. First, a tangible government interest must be implicated
in trademark law by using tax dollar to fund the trademark system.
Second, there must be a concrete way to ensure that viewpoint is not
implicated and this can be achieved by the Department of Commerce
publishing a list of words barred from trademark registration.

